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Abstract
Patient compliance with provider directions is
central to patients’ well being, and non-compliance
has been identified as a leading cause of increasing
healthcare costs. While numerous factors may affect
patient compliance, we investigate the mediating effect
of patient health information availability on the
relationship between perceived uncertainty and
patients’ motivation to comply with providers’ orders.
To understand how to mitigate perceived uncertainty,
we extend the underlying principles of principal-agent
theory—hidden information and hidden action—and
propose three uncertainty-mitigating factors:
perceived
information
asymmetry,
fear
of
opportunism, and physician quality. The proposed
structural model is empirically tested using data from
184 patients. Our model is supported, and the results
provide an understanding of the process by which
patients engage in their care through the support of
information technology. We discuss the implications
for understanding and facilitating the providerpatient relationship and its effect on patients'
motivation to comply through the principal-agent
perspective.

1. Introduction
Patient non-compliance with providers’ orders is
considered one of the major causes of low
effectiveness of medical care [1,2] and increasing
healthcare costs [3]. Further, research has shown that
patient non-adherence contributes to a significant
portion of admissions and readmissions [4-6] and is a
source of ongoing frustration with doctors [7].
Several studies have investigated the potential
underlying factors of non-adherence [3, 8-11], and
close to 200 factors have been investigated [12].
Nevertheless, no factor has been identified as fully
predictive and consistently related to patient
compliance [13-14]. In our review of the literature, we
found that uncertainty about the provider’s approach
is an essential driver of a patient’s questioning the
treatment and makes many patients reluctant to
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comply with the course of treatment. [8, 9, 11, 42, 47,
49]
To better understand the sources of patient
uncertainty and, thus, to help to mitigate its effect on
patient non-adherence, we examine this issue through
the principal-agent perspective of agency theory.
Although agency theory was originally developed for
the employer-employee relationship [15], we use
agency theory as it is understood in the information
economics literature [16-19]. Using agency theory in
this way fits our study, as the agency approach to
uncertainty suggests that self-interested parties have
incompatible goals, with hidden information and
hidden actions. This approach holds true in any
industry or socioeconomic systems in which
information asymmetry and fear of opportunism exist
in a transactional setting [20].
The principal-agent perspective has been
extensively applied in the healthcare setting, in which
patients are the principals who delegate the care
delivery responsibility to providers (agents) in
exchange for payment. This transaction takes place in
the context of uncertainty due to the fact that patients
cannot fully monitor the decision-making process, and
the provider clearly has more information about the
diagnosis and chosen course of treatment than does the
patient. These circumstances led to the fundamental
information problem of the provider-patient
transaction-based relationship: (1) the hidden
information-based diagnosis and treatment selection
and (2) the hidden action that is a morally questionable
approach to treating patients [16-17,21]. Patients often
feel that the recommended treatments involve
unnecessary medication or extended therapy so that
providers may get reimbursed for unnecessary
services.
Health economists have been evaluating such a
possibility and have recommended regulations to limit
such situations with outcome-based reimbursement vs.
fee-for-service payments. However, the cost of
monitoring the agent behavior in healthcare outweighs
the benefit gained from it, leaving room for selfinterested decision making.
In this study, we investigate the sources of
patients’ perceived uncertainty and its effect on their
motivation to comply with providers’ decision on
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treatment. Further, we evaluate the impact of the
availability of patient health information and patient
educational material on patients’ motivation to
comply. We investigate the role of information
systems in supporting the mitigation of uncertainty
and in providing patient access to relevant
information. Our recommendations may help
providers to adopt certain features of existing
electronic medical and health records systems to
increase healthcare delivery effectiveness. Finally, we
provide a foundation for regulations that may have an
impact on health information system success in
increasing patient compliance with providers’ orders.

2.

Research

Model

and

Hypotheses

We propose a theoretical model and six hypotheses, as
shown in Figure 1. Using our proposed model, we
examine the sources of patients’ perceived uncertainty
and its direct and mediated impact on patients’
motivation to comply with providers’ orders. We
propose that personal health information availability
mediates the impact of perceived uncertainty on
motivation to comply. We used previously collected
qualitative data to identify constructs that either
negatively or positively affect our proposed outcome
variable, although we do recognize that other variables
may affect patients’ motivation to comply. We also
conducted a thorough review of the literature related
to the identified constructs and propose three sources
of perceived uncertainty and one indirect mediating
effect on motivation to comply. We base our
arguments on principal-agent theory, which includes
the principles of hidden information and hidden action
as the basis for uncertainty and the degree of disbelief
about the legitimacy of the ordered treatment.

Figure 1. Proposed theoretical model

2.1 Patient Uncertainty and Motivation to
Comply
Uncertainty, by definition, is the inability to
accurately predict an outcome due to lack of perfect
information or time [22]. The literature refers to
uncertainty in the provider-patient interaction as
uncertainty of the treatment’s capability to improve

patient’s health [23]. In this study, we refer to patients’
perceived uncertainty as the disbelief in providers’
diagnosis and recommended treatment due to lack of
perfect information and perceived divergence of
interests. Because the provider collects payment for
services, regardless of the outcome, patients may feel
that, due to differing provider reimbursement
methods, they do not receive optimal treatment [2425].
To better understand this phenomenon of
uncertainty, including its sources, nature, and potential
negative impact on patients’ motivation to comply
with providers’ orders, we refer to the principal-agent
perspective of agency theory. Uncertainty increases
risk perception that influences patients’ perceived
decrease in the treatment success outcome [26].
Perceived risk is generally found to erode a
relationship in a transactional context [27] and to
negatively influence the receiving party’s compliance
[28]. Hence, we hypothesize:
H1: A higher degree of perceived uncertainty in
providers’ actions decreases the motivation to comply
with the providers’ orders.
Due to patients’ very limited face-to-face time
with their providers, they rely on additional healthrelated information, which is perceived to be useful if
it is relevant, complete, easily understandable, and
adequate [31]. When patients have questions about the
diagnosis or treatment, they find that it is a lengthy and
burdensome process to talk to the physician and often
get charged additional visit fees. As a result, they may
feel uncertain about the quality or quantity of
information that their provider shared with them [30].
Therefore, patients gather information from external
sources, which makes them feel empowered [29]. The
information asymmetry between the provider and
patient can be mitigated by the patient’s acquiring
additional health condition-specific information.
The high rate of electronic health and medical
records adoption by providers show the capacity of
and promise to reduce healthcare costs and diagnosis
errors, while increase efficiency. Electronic health and
medical records provide access to personal health
information and relevant patient education material,
but the effect of these records on treatment efficiency
has not received sufficient attention. Although the
majority of patients are not health literate, having
access to their visit notes, diagnosis, lab results, and
treatment decisions, if presented in a coherent manner,
may increase their engagement in their care and
adherence to provider decisions [32]. Patients who are
concerned about the diagnosis and treatment decision
are more likely to reach for additional health
information, and once they increase their health
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literacy, they are more likely to comply with provider
treatment decisions [33]. For the purposes of this
study, we define personal health information
availability as the proper access to relevant, reliable,
adequate, and understandable information that
increases patients’ heath literacy related to their health
condition. We concentrate on patient access to their
diagnosis and results as well as relevant patient
education material that may be provided through the
provider’s health information system. Therefore, we
hypothesize the mediating effect of personal health
information availability on the relationship between
perceived uncertainty and patients’ motivation to
comply with providers’ treatment orders.
H2: A higher degree of perceived uncertainty in
providers’ actions positively influences patients’
demand for personal health information availability.
H3: A higher degree of personal health information
availability positively influences patients’ motivation
to comply with the providers’ orders.

2.2.
Uncertainty
in
Relationship
through
Perspective

Provider-Patient
Principal-Agent

The imbalance of available information places the
patient in a vulnerable position [43], which can be
understood by the agent-principal perspective. This
perspective has been applied in the healthcare setting
to investigate the provider-patient relationship [3536]. As adopted from Pavlou et al. [37], the principalagent perspective is presented in Table 1, which
presents the six requirements for the principal-agent
theory to hold and includes the corresponding
requirements for the provider-patient interaction.
Table 1. Application of the principal-agent
perspective in provider-agent interaction
Principal-Agent

Provider-Patient Relationships
Human Action
The patient (principal) delegates
responsibility to a provider (agent)
to deliver services to improve
patient’s health in exchange for
payment.

Principal
delegates
authority or
responsibility to
an agent who
acts on his or her
behalf.
Divergence of Interests
Principals and
The patient wants to receive
agents have
effective and high quality treatment
different interests for the least amount of money.
and goals.
Provider is motivated to receive as
much payment as possible for the

services, which may not be the most
effective treatment options.
Potential for Agent’s Gainful Exchange
Possibility for
The provider has the opportunity to
agents to gain by diagnose the patient in a way that
shirking
treatment choice would maximize
responsibility or
provider’s benefit rather than
acting
improve patient’s health.
opportunistically.
Difficulty in Monitoring / Enforcing Human Action
Principals cannot The patient cannot easily monitor
easily monitor
whether provider has made a proper
agents and
or most appropriate diagnosis and
enforce their
treatment choice.
expected actions.
Agents Not Bearing the Consequences of their Actions
Agents act on
The provider has the freedom to
behalf of
diagnose a patient based on available
principals who
information
and
choose
an
own the assets
appropriate
treatment
deemed
being managed.
suitable by the provider.
Temporal Duration
There is a time
It may take a considerable amount of
lag in which the
time before the effectiveness of
agent’s actions
diagnosis and chosen treatment
can be
effectiveness can be measured.
manifested.
There are many variables involved,
and the responsibility of the provider
narrows with the time lag.

Mitigating uncertainty is highly dependent on
trust, which has a rich literature in organizational
behavior [27], information systems [38], social
networks [39], buyer-seller relationships [40],
economics [41], and doctor-patient relationships [42].
For the purposes of this study, we identify the sources
of uncertainty and their mediating effect on patient
motivation to comply with providers’ orders. Hence,
we purposely omit trust, as it is unrealistic to assume
that a patient can build trust with a provider after a
brief meeting, particularly with a patient’s awareness
of possible hidden information and hidden actions.
To identify the sources of perceived uncertainty,
we follow the literature and apply the relevant
constructs through the principal-agent perspective.
The known gap in knowledge between provider and
patients [35] provides information asymmetry [43].
During the short face-to-face meeting with the
provider, patients may not receive sufficient
information to fully understand and accept the
diagnosis and recommended treatment. There is
certainly little time to challenge the provider’s
findings due to the knowledge gap and often
intimidating approach of providers [44]. Hence, we
hypothesize:
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H4: A higher degree of information asymmetry
between providers and patients increases patients’
perceived uncertainty.
When the principal-agent goals are incompatible
and the hired agent may act in his or her own benefit,
the principal may feel that his or her transaction
provides an opportunity for the agent to act
opportunistically. Because the principal cannot
monitor the agent’s decisions and behavior, due to
information asymmetry, opportunism may take place
in the principal-agent transaction [45].
In the healthcare context, the provider may choose
to diagnose the patient in a way that provides an
opportunity for additional tests or medication that
increases chargeable services and goods in addition to
the necessary and adequate level, based on patients’
condition [46]. We define fear of opportunism as the
patient’s concern that the provider acts
opportunistically during their transaction. Angell [47]
defined doctors as “double agents” who cannot be
expected to “withhold beneficial care to save money
for third-party payer.” However, it is difficult to
monitor what is beneficial and necessary. Because
patients are vulnerable to unfair diagnosis and
treatment choices due to a costly and cumbersome
overview for compliance, this provides the grounds for
hidden actions on behalf of the providers, which
increases patients’ uncertainty. Hence, we propose:
H5: A higher degree of fear of provider opportunism
positively influences patients’ perceived uncertainty.
In this research, we identified provider quality
based on Jayanti’s [48] constructs of empathy,
communication, and competence. Thus, our
evaluation goes beyond professional qualifications to
involve the personal qualities of the provider as well.
Patients’ agreeing with providers’ orders and
complying with their treatment decision has been
found to be positively correlated with physician
empathy and communication [498]. Hence, we
propose:
H6: Higher patient perception of provider quality
negatively influences patients’ perceived uncertainty.

3. Research Methodology
We selected the outpatient context for the
provider-patient relationship to test the indicators and
antecedents of perceived uncertainty and its effect on
patients’ intention to comply with providers’ orders.

3.1 Measurement Development and Survey
Administration
Measurement items were adopted from the literature
and modified for the context of this study. All
variables were measured indirectly by reflective,
direct measurement items. We used a 5-point Likertscale that allowed respondents to express their level of
agreement (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree)
with the measurement items. The pilot study was
administered to family members and friends as
recommended by Churchill [50]. Based on pilot
respondents’ feedback, face validity was reviewed and
discussed by a group of experienced researchers. The
final survey consisted of 41 measurement items
(questions). Table 2 presents the measures and their
sources from the literature.
Table 2. Structural Model Measurement Items
Measured Variable
No.
of Supported by
Measures Literature
Intention to Comply

5

[82-83]

Perceived Uncertainty

4

[84]

Perceived Information
Asymmetry

4

[37] [78] [79]

Personal Health Record
Quality

16

[80] [31]

Provider Quality

12

[38][48] [81-82]

Health Info. Availability

4

[32]

After revision of the questions, the final version
was administered to respondents drawn from
convenience and snowball sampling. Because most of
us have been patients, we reached out to friends and
asked them to complete the survey and to pass it on to
others. We also used social media to promote the
survey. A link to an online survey was provided, which
included an explanation of the survey context and
definitions of the variables, along with consent [51].
The data collection took place from May to August
2015, and we received 217 responses, of which 184
were fully completed.

4. Data Analysis and Results
Partial least squares (PLS) was used to validate
and test our measurement and structural models, for
which we used SmartPLS Statistical Software for
Structural Equation Modeling (version 3.2.1 Windows

3350

64 bit). The PLS statistical method, a componentbased latent structural equation modeling technique,
provides more flexibility in terms of sample size and
residual distribution [52-54].

4.1 Measurement Validation
Internal consistency exceeded 0.90 and was
considered adequate for all principal constructs. We
tested for construct validity through convergent
(measures that should be related are, indeed, related)
and discriminant (measures that should not be related
are, indeed, not related) validity checks. The
correlations among all constructs were below the 0.90
threshold, but related to an extent, and almost all
statistically significant at the p < 0.05 and p < 0.01
levels. The square root of average variance extracted
(AVE) was greater than that of any other crosscorrelations, and AVEs were greater than the 0.5
threshold, indicating that the principal constructs
capture higher construct-related variance than errorrelated variance. We also performed principal
component factor analysis, which showed that all
items loaded on their corresponding constructs and
with higher factor loadings than cross-loadings. The
confirmatory factor analysis confirmed that items
loaded to their principal constructs with clear loading
patterns.
We tested for common method bias that may occur
in self-report questionnaires due to something external
to the measures. Bias can occur when one factor
accounts for most of the variance due to item
construction, item order, audience, scale used, and so
forth [55]. As recommended by Podsakoff et al. [55],
we employed Harman’s single factor test, using
exploratory factor analysis as widely used in the
literature [56-60]. We received nearly equal variance
loadings across the factors; therefore, this test revealed
no indication of common method bias. The previously
performed correlation among constructs did not reveal
an extreme correlation (>0.90), as the highest
construct correlation was 0.74. We also tested for
partial correlations, as suggested by Podsakoff et al.
[55], whereby we added the highest loaded factor into
the PLS model as another control factor. Because none
of the dependent variables increased significantly, no
common method bias was indicated using the partial
correlation method, either.

4.2 Control Variables
We chose five control variables from the literature
and had limited missing values returned for these
control variables, which we handled through the mean
imputation method [61]. We performed a complete
control variable analysis prior to our research model

analysis. Four control variables (gender, age, income,
and health knowledge) had a significant relationship
with one or more of the endogenous variables and
were included in the final structural model to ensure
that their effect was accounted for. Although their
effect is statistically significant, they had limited effect
on the structural model’s endogenous variables, which
we measured through change in coefficient of
determinants with and without the control variables
(∆R2 < 0.1).

4.3 Structural Model Test
The structural model was tested against the
hypotheses through path coefficients, statistical
significance, and R-squared value. Path coefficients
measure the strength of the relationship between the
independent and dependent variables, while the Rsquared values indicate the predictive power of the
model [62]. A nonparametric bootstrapping technique
was used to calculate the t-statistics values in
SmartPLS to test for statistical significance of the path
coefficients [63-64]. We used the full sample to test
the six hypotheses that we developed. The
standardized PLS path coefficients, R2, total and
mediated effects, and control variables involved in
testing the structural model are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Path coefficients in the structural model
The standardized regression coefficients are
generated first, followed by bootstrapping.
Resampling with replacement at least 1,000 times is
necessary for valid t-values, as suggested by Chin et
al. [53]. R-squared (R2) values are reported for
endogenous construct, as suggested Hulland [65].
As hypothesized, perceived uncertainty has a
significant negative direct effect on motivation to
comply (b = -0.267, p < 0.05) and supported H1.
Perceived uncertainty also has a significant and
relatively strong positive effect on personal health
information availability (b = 0.376, p < 0.05), explains
21 percent of its variance, and supports H2. Personal
health information availability has a significant
positive effect on motivation to comply (b = 0.591, p
< 0.01), which explains 36% of its variance and
supports H3.
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The indicators of perceived uncertainty explained
48 percent of its variance. Unexpectedly, the perceived
information asymmetry has a relatively week but
significant negative effect on perceived information
asymmetry (b = -0.107, p < 0.05) and does not support
H4. Fear of opportunism has a strong significant
positive (b = 0.621, p < 0.05) effect on perceived
uncertainty and confirms H5. As hypothesized,
physician quality (b = -0.537, p < 0.01) showed a
strong negative, significant relationship with
perceived uncertainty and validated H6.

4.4 Mediation Analysis
Mediation occurs when a specific intervention
influences an outcome and takes on a temporal and
causal relationship. Mediation analysis may help to
determine a more successful and cost-effective
approach when developed using a proper prior theory
and within the appropriate context.
When a predictor variable’s significant effect on
the outcome variable weakens through the
introduction of a third variable, the mediator, an
indirect or mediated effect is supported [66]. Full or
complete mediation exists when the significant effect
between the predictor and outcome variables become
zero by adding the mediator variable. If the effect or
relationship is reduced in size, partial mediation exists
[67].
To test the mediating effect of personal health
information availability, we followed Baron and
Kenny’s [66] test for mediation. We directly linked the
perceived uncertainty construct to motivation to
comply and removed the personal health information
availability construct. The relationship between
perceived uncertainty and motivation to comply
showed a significant negative effect (b = -0.489, p <
0.05). Once the personal health information
availability construct was added back to the model, the
effect decreased to b = -0.267. Following Baron and
Kenny (1986), we performed bootstrapping for the
valid t-value. We captured the mediator path
coefficients (b1 = 0.376, b2 = 0.591) and standard errors
(SE1=0.0736,
SE1=0.0813)
from
perceived
uncertainty to personal health information availability
and, from there, to the motivation to comply. We used
a free Sobel Test Calculator for the Significance of
Mediation [68] and received a Sobel test statistic of
4.179, of which the absolute value is greater than 1.96
(p < 0.05). This revealed that personal health
information availability partially mediates perceived
uncertainty’s effect on motivation to comply, as the
direct effect between perceived uncertainty and
motivation to comply decreased when the mediator
was added in the integrative model [66].

Combining all this information, we can conclude
that, of the -0.489 unit difference in motivation to
comply that is attributable to a unit difference in
perceived uncertainty, 0.222 of it is the result of the
mediator effect of personal health information
availability, which increases health literacy, which, in
turn, increases motivation to comply with providers’
order. The remaining -0.267 unit difference is direct,
spurious, or attributable to other indirect effects not
explicitly modeled [69].

5. Discussion
In this study, we examined the sources of perceived
uncertainty and its effect on motivation to comply with
providers’ orders through the principal-agent
perspective. We also investigated the mediating effect
of personal health information availability. Using the
PLS method, we developed a structural model and six
hypotheses, which were empirically validated with
184 respondents who provided their input on the latent
variables that we measured.
This study has several key findings with
meaningful theoretical and practical implications. We
formally proposed that the process of diagnosing
symptoms, identifying course of treatments, and
ordering self-delivered care should be viewed as
agency relationships, whereby the proposed principalagent perspective applies in the provider-patient
transaction process. The hidden information and
action principles of the principal-agent perspective
helped us to identify the sources of perceived
uncertainty. This understanding can be applied to the
mitigation of perceived uncertainly to achieve better
patient motivation to comply. The mediator of
personal health information availability also may be
used to help reduce the two underlying fundamental
agency problems.
This paper’s primary contribution is to introduce
personal health information availability as a key
mediating variable in a model, which incorporates the
agent-principal perspective, that explains patient
motivation to comply with providers’ orders. Patients’
compliance has a great impact on the health of patients
and on healthcare costs. Studies that examine the
provider-patient relationship through a principal-agent
perspective are driven by health economics principles
developed by Mitnick and Ross’s [70, 77] relational
and institutions-based incentives-driven approach. We
add to the patient-provider relationship literature by
testing the precursors of perceived uncertainty in
healthcare, which is a precursor to patient motivation
to comply with providers’ orders. These relationships
have been overlooked in the literature, as information
availability has been limited to the Internet [8] or face-

3352

to-face provider-patient communication [71]. With
widely available and patient-accessible patient portals
and education materials accessible or given at the time
of provider visits, it is important to evaluate the
transparent personal health records’ and patients’
health-related information’s impact on patient
compliance intention.
Studies that attempt to explain patient adherence
[72-76] without an understating of the mediating role
of personal health information availability, and its
precursors and nature, likely result in incomplete and
potentially misleading theories. In this study, we
identified three factors—perceived information
asymmetry, fear of opportunism, and provider
quality—that may potentially mitigate perceived
uncertainty by helping to uncover the hidden actions
and hidden information.
We identified and described, on a more granular
level, the process that develops and potentially
mitigates perceived uncertainty and the mediator that
facilitates patient motivation to comply. We proposed
fear of opportunism and information asymmetry as
factors in the agent-principal perspective, and this
study is the first to use these constructs as indicators
of perceived uncertainty in healthcare. The third
variable, provider quality, has been studied as a latent
variable in other studies [8] but has not been
previously used as an indicator of perceived
uncertainty.
The strong positive effect (b = 0.621, p < 0.05) of
fear of opportunism on perceived uncertainty is driven
by patients who believe that doctors act in their own
interests when adding chargeable services or products.
Educating such patients during and after their visit, by
providing proper access to relevant and
understandable information related to their personal
health condition, may greatly reduce patients’
uncertainty about the recommended treatment and
increase the motivation to comply with the ordered
treatment.
The unexpected negative effect of perceived
information asymmetry (b = -0.107, p < 0.05) may be
due to the fact that patients often feel “lost” after
talking to the doctor and blame themselves for not
fully understanding what the doctor told them. In that
case, they believe that the doctor is right and decrease
their uncertainty about the diagnosis and treatment
decision. We recommend to increase the health
literacy by providing access to personal health
information and relevant educational material.

6. Limitations and Future Directions
The principal-agent perspective has been
developed and widely used in understanding the
employer-employee relationship. We indicated the six

key theoretical requirements that must be satisfied in
the patient-provider service transaction approach, but
this perspective will require further research to
confirm its fit in the patient-provider context.
We excluded the possible moderating relationship
of a “second opinion,” which is a major factor in terms
of reducing uncertainty. Although this option is freely
available to any patient, most patients, due to the
additional cost and time involved, do not take
advantage of this for less complicated healthcare
needs. An extension of this study could be an
evaluation of whether providers consider the
possibility of other professionals’ viewing their
decision and the extent to which it limits their possible
opportunism. This could take place the monitoring of
agent behavior for compliance and fairness.
Furthermore, engaging in multiple doctor visits may
develop a level of comfort in the patient if previous
treatment plans were effective and successful. It may
be worthwhile to introduce the moderating effect of
“second-opinions” and multiple doctor visits into our
proposed model.
The use of snowball sampling helped with the
response rate and resulted in low-cost data collection.
It could, however, have introduced bias into the
sample responses, as many respondents referred
another respondent to complete the survey, thereby
limiting the generalizability of the findings.

7. Conclusion
In this study, we found that patient utilization of
electronic health and medical records, which provides
patient insight into provider decisions, coupled with
provider-supplied relevant educational material, may
potentially reduce perceived uncertainty and increase
patients’ motivation to comply with providers’ orders.
We recommended the use of health information
technology to possibly increase patient compliance.
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